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Abstract 
This article interrogates, in theoretical cum descriptive fashion, the linkage(s) between neo-liberal globalisation, 
the state, and the state of human rights, using sub-Sahara Africa as a research backdrop. Drawing majorly from 
secondary data, it found out that the post-colonial states in Africa have been at the mercies of this technologically 
driven post- cold war phenomenon. It argues that globalisation has incapacitated African states and thus unable to 
safeguard and protect the human rights of their citizens 
The article recommended that the state, the epicentre of the socio-economic space in Africa, needs to be 
reconstituted via an autochthonous process.
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Introduction
That the state exists in furtherance of good life presupposes that it exists to recongnise and to protect fundamental 
human rights. Right from ancient Athens, the state has been credited to be the custodian of good life (Aristotle 1981), but 
with the decline of Athens this ideal declined too. As Sparta superseded Athens, the ideal of an all-inclusive Polis which 
guaranteed the good life was gradually superseded by the notion of homo militans which eventually prevailed from the 
ascendancy of Sparta to the end of Roman interregnum (Ake 2001:8). During the Christian middle ages, the ideal of homo 
credens reigned supreme as the Christians, rather than seeing the state as the arena for advancing the good life, saw 
themselves as mere pilgrims passing through human society. 
Although in Renaissance Italy attempts were made by philosophers, notably Machiavelli, to reach back to the classical 
Athens, the outcomes were more Roman than Athenian. However, this morally inspired ideal that had been eclipsed for 
centuries resurfaced by courtesy of the liberal onslaught launched by John Locke and other liberal theorists of his age 
(Held 1984:3). Gradually, liberalism, which seeks to isolate the private sphere from the state, became associated with the 
doctrine that freedom of choice should be applied to matters as diverse as marriage, religion, economic and political 
affairs. In this view, the political universe consists of ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individuals with natural rights which God had freely 
given and thus the raison d’etre of the state is to recognise and to protect the rights of individuals in the community. 
Accordingly, the notion of and ‘civil rights’ and ‘civil liberties’, which began to be developed in the domestic law of 
England in the seventeenth century, found its first full flowering almost simultaneously in the French Declaration de droits 
de phomme et du citoyen in 1789 and the US Bill of Rights’ of 1791 (Nwabueze 2003: 8-9). However, for a long time these 
principles found no echo in international law as private individuals were still not the subject of the law but subjects of the 
sovereign, having those rights which they were allowed at the level of domestic law. This remained the position until 
1945. The atrocities perpetrated by Hitler and Mussolini against their citizens were not only moral outrages which 
shocked the conscience of all mankind but were a very real threat to international peace and stability. Thus a challenge 
was thrown to the international community (Pagels 1979). At the Yalta Conference, the victorious allied powers agreed 
to create a new body to supplant the League of Nations.
This time, however, they chose a different path from the one they had trodden in 1919; instead of imposing peace 
treaties on the vanquished, they sought to establish a new legal order founded on the three principles declared in article 1 
of the UN Charter: 
The peaceful settlement of international disputes in conformity with the principle of justice and international 
law; friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self- 
determination of people and respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion. 
However, by the time of the adoption of the UN Charter, it had not proved possible to define in detail what these 
human rights and fundamental freedoms were and in order to repair this omission, the United Nations proceeded to 
draft the famous Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which they adopted three years later, on 10 December, 
1948.
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Conscious of the fact that the Universal Declaration was not a binding treaty in international law, the United Nations 
proceeded to try to transform it into detailed treaty law. But it was not until 1966 that they were able to adopt the 
product in the form of the twin UN Covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – and it took yet another ten years before 
these two treaties would enter into force in 1976. Thus, with the establishment of human rights regime at the global 
level, various measures were taken at the regional levels to entrench human rights. For example, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR) was adopted as early as the 1950s 
and entered into force only three years later
In Africa, states individually and collectively under the auspices of the OAU (now AU) sought to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, a continental legal framework that binds African states to one another 
with regard to the practice of human rights was put in place. In Africa today, not only have states ratified the African 
Charter but they havethe universal bill of rights entrenched unto their constitutions. Evidently, the state in Africa is the 
custodian of human rights.
This article considers African experience with regard to the practice of human rights by arguing that underlying the 
litany of human rights violations in Africa in contemporary times is the issues of a declining state capacity, a phenomenon 
that has been exacerbated by market-oriented globalisation. In other words, one of the greatest challenges facing Africa 
today is how to strike the right balance between the push for human rights and the forces of globalisation. This is turn 
provokes some questions, such as: how can the state’s systemic loss of capacity to manage the economy be reconciled 
with the demands for human rights? How can the African state be reconstituted to serve as a bridge between human 
rights and development? 
The central thesis of this paper is that globalisation has profound implications for the realisation of the goal of 
promoting human dignity as encapsulated in the United Nations Universal Declaration and the Africa Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights. The arguments in this chapter have been developed into five sections, including the introductory 
background. Section two sets the framework of the study by defining concepts. The third section reviews literature on 
Africa’s practice of human rights. Section four analyses African’s contemporary dilemma. The fifth section puts forward a 
number of recommendations and options for state reform and concludes the chapter.
Conceptual discourse
In a study of this nature, it is apposite to conceptualise, giving operational meanings to some important concepts to 
facilitate their contextual operationalisation and comprehension. As a result, four concepts which in all indications are 
essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1962) are identified, vis; Africa, the state, human rights and globalisation. In essence 
we begin with the conceptualisation of Africa, later proceed to that of the state, human rights and globalisation.
Defining Africa
What constitutes Africa has always been problematic to scholars studying the continent. Geographically, it is sometimes 
used to refer to all countries on the mainland continent plus the six island nations of Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and São Tomé and Principe. However in much of the literature, including this paper, the term, 
‘Africa’ is instead used synonymously with what more accurately would be called sub-Sahara Africa, to mean just the forty 
-eight African countries excluding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt ( Moss 2007:2). Although such distinction is 
arguable, in development circles countries of North Africa are typically placed in the Middle East because they are in 
many ways more part of the cultural and political life of the region.
The state
The nature of the state, remarks Held (1984:1), is hard to grasp and thus remains one of the most problematic in the field 
of political science (Basiru 2009). But despite the difficulty in grasping the nature of the state, the fact remains that as an 
apparatus of rule, it appears to be everywhere regulating all facets of life. As Ralph (1969 : 49) avers, ‘it is not a thing as 
such, what it stands for is a number of particular institutions which together constitute its reality and which interact as 
part of what may be called the state system.’ In other words the state, because of its being largely an abstract entity, is 
concretised by the medley of institutions which operate in its name. 
From institutional perspectives, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the public bureaucracy, and the army and 
the police are often included. Apart from these institutions, argues Egwu (2006: 410), other ontological features of the 
state include the specific personnel that occupy specific positions within the state apparatus and the activities of those 
who may be broadly defined as governing elites. Aside from the institutional manifestation of the state as pointed out by 
some writers, violence is also associated with the structure of the state. Max Weber more than any other writer on the 
state emphasises this criterion. According to him: ‘A state is that human community that successfully claims the monopoly 
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of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Geerth and Mill 1967). Another issue in the analysis of the 
modern state is the nature or character of forces which structure its behaviour. Thus in extant literature, two broad 
perspectives have emerged: the society-centred and the state-centred. 
However, within each perspective there are different traditions. For example, the society perspective has three 
theoretical offsprings which according to Egwu (2006) are not epistemologically related. According to the pluralist school, 
the state emerges as a neutral arbiter to mediate in the struggle among the various groups in the society (Dahl 1961). The 
elite theory of the state contends that there exists a tendency for the elites as opposed to the mass to monopolise public 
power and authority and thereby to ensure stability; the state must exist for the elites. The third model in the society-
centred perspective is the Marxist theory of the state which is further polarised into two because its progenitor, Karl 
Marx, never really formulated a coherent theory of the state. 
Thus, the instrumental school drawing from the Communist Manifesto 1848 contends that the modern capitalist state 
is an instrument in the hands of the ruling class or more specifically as the executive committee that manages the 
common affairs of the bourgeoisie. The structuralist on the hand argues that the state does not serve the interests of the 
dominant class as claimed by the instrumentalists. According to Poulantzas (1974), the state promotes the interests of the 
ruling class not because the personnel of the state share the social and biological background with those who control the 
economy. Instead, it is because of the objective role of the state as an important structure in the capitalist society.
Unlike the society-centred perspectives, the state-centred viewpoint that is echoed in the works of Skocpcol (1985) 
and others sees the state as an independent variable. In other words, the state is a set of structures that is set apart from 
the society. It is, however, important to remark here that each of the approaches to the analysis of the state represents an 
attempt to highlight different aspect of the reality of the state. Thus, whether the state is an independent variable or not, 
the fact remains that it does exist in modern society and appears to be everywhere regulating people lives.
Human rights
The concept of human rights like the concept of democracy is riddled with definitional controversies. As Nwabueze 
(2003:3) avers, ‘the concept of rights bristles with difficulty but the difficulty is infinitely greater in relations to human 
rights.’ One notable area is the tendency in literature to conflate human rights with human dignity. In fact, the latter is 
invented while the former in innate. Again, Nwabueze reasons thus: ‘being innate in man human dignity thus is coeval 
with him; he is born with it, not so the concept of human right.’ Another area of controversy is the nature of human 
rights. In other words, whether they are legally created or natural. 
However, in recent times, there seems to be a consensus as some writers have contended that man with his in-born 
dignity existed before the state and could not have had human rights from inception and before the advent of the state. 
Elaine Pagels (1979) summarises this position thus: ‘surely the individual could have no human rights independent from 
and ever prior to participation in any social or political collective’.
The foregoing suggests that humans rights are a concept, a device, invented in response to the growth of state power 
and the danger it poses to the liberty of the individual. Thus, in modern usage, human rights are legal rights because they 
derive their binding force from the law of the state. Another grey area that is often identified in htoday uman rights 
literature is whether human rights are coterminous with liberty. In fact, in some constitutions, the two concepts are used 
interchangeably. For example, the preambles form in the body of Bills of Right in the constitutions of nine anglophone 
countries reads thus: 
Whereas every persons is entitled to the fundamental human rights, and freedom of the individual, that is to 
say the right to life, liberty, security of person and the protection of the law ( Nwabueze, 2003:38). 
In the Fifth Amendment to the US constitution, liberty as guaranteed suggested that ‘no person shall be ... deprived of 
life liberty or property without due process of law’. 
Thus, the US Supreme Court in 1897 categorically defined liberty as:
The liberty mentioned in the amendment (fifth amendment) means not only the right of the citizen to be free 
from the mere physical restraint of his person as by incarceration but the term is deemed to embrace the 
right of the citizen to be free. In the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways to 
live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or vocation 
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary or essential to his carrying 
but to a successful, conclusion the purpose above mentioned (Nwabueze, 2003: 56)
As defined above, liberty is wider in scope than human rights. It embraces all a person’s rights and interests in a free 
society. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, what constitutes human rights? As implied above, human rights are rights 
attached to man because of his humanity (NWLR 1987:589). As Donnelly (1982:305) avers, ‘human rights are not the 
result of one’s actions, they arise from no special undertaking beyond memberships in the human race.’ Thus, not all 
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rights held by human beings are human rights. For example, rights created by contract between two human beings arise 
otherwise than by virtue purely of their humanity and are therefore not human rights. Finally, much of the literature has 
embraced a more holistic and integrated conception of human rights. The rights of man include not only rights inherent in 
man’s humanity but also rights relating to the material things necessary for the maintenance of a dignified existence as a 
human being (food, shelter, health, clothing, medical care, education, etc.).
The concept of globalisation
Globalisation is perhaps one of the most fashionable but controversial terms in political economy today. As Patman 
(2006:4) puts it, ‘despite vast literature on the subject, it is difficult to give a precise definition of globalisation.’ In a similar 
vein, Obadan (2004) contends that:
The concept of globalisation is perhaps today the most recurrent term employed by scholars and world, 
leaders alike to rationalize, the development and underdevelopment of the various part of the world. As a 
result of this, it has assumed the status of an essentially contested concept.
Thus, definitions have proliferated in literature. Basically, it refers to the development of increasingly integrated 
systems and relations beyond a nation’s borders. It is a multidimensional and multifaceted process that encompasses 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. To Ikeme (2008:2), globalisation is the trend of the increasing 
integration of economies in terms not only of goods and services but of ideas, information and technology. 
According to him, globalisation means trade liberalisation, free capital mobility, privatisation, commercialisation and 
the empowerment of transnational corporations. In a similar vein, it has been described as a neoliberal ideology which 
tries to elevate the role of the market as an instrument for nurturing innovation among social actors and as an instrument 
also for rationalisation in the distribution of the planet’s resources (Hamouda 2000:31; Toyo 2002:17). Among other 
things, the process of globalisation involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distance through a dramatic 
reduction in time taken either physically or representationally to cross them. As Scholte (2005: 14) claims, ‘a shift in 
geography whereby borders have become increasingly porous.’
From the foregoing, it is clear that ‘globalisation’ is a development buzzword and it replaces ‘modernisation’ which is 
now widely seen as a failed capitalist development paradigm. Thus by following Olayode (2006), globalisation for the 
purpose of this paper is a process consisting of technological, economic, political and cultural dimensions that 
interconnect individuals, firms and governments across national borders.
Human rights practices in Africa
No region of the world benefited from the spirit of San Francisco more than Africa. Courtesy of Article 1(2) of the United 
Nations, the process of decolonisation was given legal backing. Consequently by 1960, a year the United Nations 
declared that lack of independence was no reason for delaying it, many African colonies achieved statehood. Like other 
regions that went through tortuous colonial experiences, the African region immediately faced challenges of development 
and nation building, but it was not long before African leaders realised that some of these challenges could only be 
surmounted at the pan-African level. Thus in May 1963, a Pan-African organisation, the Organization of African Unity 
(now Africa Union), was formed. With the formation the continental body, Africa was set to the organisation of furthering 
its interests in the global system.
Thus, like other regional bodies, the OAU aimed at using the post-1945 international legal order to pursue African 
interests. It sought to terminate all forms of colonialism that continued to erode the dignity of Africans. To face this 
challenge squarely, an OAU liberation committee with a special liberation fund was set up (Ajala 1998). However, despite 
the efforts of Africa to ensure the liberation of oppressed Africans, it did not have an African framework for guaranteeing 
human rights; it was not until 19 January 1981 that the organisation adopted a regional charter on Human rights – African 
charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which came into force on 21 October 1986.
With this instrument, the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual was carried beyond the confines of the 
domestic laws of the individual African countries into the arena of the community of all Africa states, thereby engaging the 
collective conscience and the common concern of the entire continent in the matter (Nwabueze 2003: 57). With the 
coming into force of the charter, opinions were divided among analysts. The Afro-pessimists contended that the charter 
is a watershed in the history of human rights practice in Africa (Umozurike 1983: 902). 
The Afro-pessimists argue that it does not tally with genuine African interests (Ake 1987:56). Resolving this 
controversy is outside the scope of this article, but the fact remains that in today’s Africa, the charter has become the 
grundnorm of human rights practice in Africa as it has been virtually ratified by all states. At this juncture, a poser is apt:
have the principles of the charter translated into reality? The next section will attempt to offer an answer.
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The African state, human rights and the challenges of globalisation
What is the nature of the state in Africa? What is the link between the African state and human rights? How has 
globalisation affected the capacity of African states? This section of the paper attempts to provide answers to these 
questions by drawing from relevant empirical examples on the African continent. Thus, to understand the nexus between 
the African state and human rights calls for the deciphering of the nature of the African state which must be set within the 
context of African state formation and the model of politico-economic development adopted by the state managers to 
legitimise it. 
This necessarily implies that the modus operandi of the African state – as defined by its colonial origin, the nature of the 
class that inherited state power at independence, what is defined by this class as the basis goal of the state and the 
strategy it has evolved for sustaining its leading position in the political economy – all become very critical issues to engage 
(Egwu 2006:420). However, to appreciate the central role of the state in Africa in the creation of rights, and by extension 
democracy, we must begin with the analysis of the role it plays in the organisation of economic production and the 
regulation of the society. 
The specificity of the state in Africa is marked by the historical conditions that led to the emergence of the post- 
colonial state, namely the imperative of responding to the crisis of accumulation created by colonialism. Thus, right from 
the inception of colonialism, the colonial state had been charged with the onerous responsibility of tailoring the African 
economy toward the needs of the market; to achieve this goal, it needed to be all powerful (Ake 2001:2). At 
independence, despite the change in the composition of the state managers, the character of the state remains the same 
much as it was during the colonial era. 
In essence, the statist character of the over-developed post-colonial state (Alavi 1972) spurred the emergence of a 
class of predatory political elite whose main preoccupation was in using the state power to further their material interests 
(Schwartzberg 1980). The dominant faction of the ruling class, knowing that its de facto position was under constant 
threat, had to invent an ideology of development in order to legitimise its rulership. To them, since national development 
required a unity of purpose and utmost discipline, it cannot be served by oppositional attitude. What invariably emerged 
was the dictatorship of development. Multiparty politics came to be regarded as being foreign to Africa’s historical 
experience.
In fact, the first president of an independent Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, in 1963 referred to multiparty politics as 
‘football democracy’ ( Anyang Nyongo 1995: 34). According to him: 
Where there is one party and that party is intensified [identified?] with the nation as a whole, the 
foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each 
representing a section of the community (Nyerere 1969 :195).
As the dominant faction of the ruling class was not really interested in real development (social transformation), but 
rather in how to survive, the class passed on the responsibility for development to foreign patrons, by extension 
embracing the Western model of development, thereby giving the custodians of the global capitalist system unfettered 
access to the African economy. 
Thus, from the 1970s, the Bretton Wood twin institutions, the IMF and World Bank, assumed a major responsibility in 
charting the direction of African economies. By the early 1980s, with the coming to power of right-wing governments in 
some Western capitals, the IMF and the World Bank had to shed off their Keynesian outlook and embrace a new 
monetarist agenda (World Bank 1981). So the consequence of a changed outlook no doubt had far-reaching 
consequences for African states, which by then were the chief customers of the two institutions (Ohiorhenaum 
2002:  10 -11). 
And since African states’ leaders neither had the desire nor the will to resist the encroachment of these institutions, 
they had no choice but to embrace the new neoliberal philosophy of getting the price right (Ake 2001: 34). The market 
reforms, as hinted earlier, were initiated and promoted by the IMF and the World Bank through the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Thus, in a sense, it is the global application and implementation of SAP which is now more 
appropriately referred to as globalisation. The elements of the structural adjustment reforms include deregulation and 
liberalisation of the economy, privatisation of public enterprises, and withdrawal of subsidy from some public services 
where this used to be the case and devaluation of the national currency and other related market reforms (Alli 2006: 
337). 
Thus, with the adoption of market-oriented SAP, the African states had to withdraw from developmental roles;  this 
hampered the recovery of many countries and led to further deterioration in the social services. This is why the greatest 
impact of globalisation on African social formations and on its citizens is in the area where the state used to play significant 
roles in the lives of people (Knor 2001:20). Such burdens of the transition from state-centred economies to free market 
economies has been borne by the masses. Market reform in Africa has meant increased prices for basic necessities, 
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service fees for health and education, retrenchment in the formal employment force, etc. In the early 1980s an estimated 
130 million people were living in poverty; by the early 1990s, the number of poor people increased to about 180 million 
(Olayode 2006: 18)
The foregoing has indicated that market oriented globalisation in whatever guise has unleashed much aggression on 
the state in Africa. This development in all indications has two implications for human rights. First, the inability of the state 
to provide basic social needs to the people has led to the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms. Obviously, a state 
that has lost its sovereignty cannot guarantee fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life. Second, in order to 
implement some of the reforms, the African state has become more repressive and anti-democratic, thereby further 
depriving the people of their basic rights (see Mkandawire & Olukoshi 1995). As Issa shivji (2009:130) puts it, ‘with 
neoliberalism, the state disowned its responsibility to educate, clothe, maintain and care for its people.’
Conclusion
The previous sections of the chapter established that contemporary Africa faces the dilemma of how to reconcile the 
demand for human rights and the weakening capacities of the state brought about by neoliberal globalisation. If the state, 
as this paper has suggested, is the custodian of human rights and fundamental freedom, its integrity is supposedly vital. A 
free republican state, as once remarked by Machiavelli, guarantees freedoms, but historical evidence suggests that the 
state in Africa is not independent of both endogenous and exogenous forces. In fact, its edges have been shaped and re- 
shaped by imperialist forces. In the present epoch, market-oriented globalisation symbolises such a scenario. 
Therefore, if the state is the major obstacle, how do we strengthen the African state? Strengthening the state should 
go beyond superficial ‘reforms’, as the continent’s experience has suggested. It calls for an all-inclusive process in which all 
state structures and institutions are democratised. A truly democratic, autonomous state has the best prospect for 
promoting the national interest and human rights. 
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